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Introduction 
Professor Kahn-Freund remarked in 1955:  
‘Since in our societies marriage is the basis for the normal family, it follows that 
marriage must have a profound effect on the property of the spouse … It is difficult 
to imagine any system of law which in its regulation of the impact of marriage on 
property could completely ignore these elementary social facts, ie confine itself to a 
strict rule of “separation of property” in the sense that marriage has no effect on the 
property of the spouse at all.’1 
Yet, in the mid-twentieth century, a separate property approach remained the prevailing 
matrimonial property regime in many countries across the common law world. Even today in 
Ireland, it is arguable that marriage still does not have a ‘profound’ effect on property. The 
property rights of spouses continue to be held on the basis of title and are not automatically 
altered by marriage. Through the years, however, significant modifications have been made 
to the prevailing property scheme.  
The Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 which governs the remedy of divorce in Ireland plays an 
especially important role in this regard.2 Central to the 1996 Act are important measures 
governing the ancillary (financial) relief available on divorce.3 Recognising the constitutional 
imperative that ‘proper provision’ must exist for spouses and dependent children prior to 
                                                          
1
 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Matrimonial Property in England’ in Wolfgang Friedmann (ed), Matrimonial 
Property Law (Stevens and Sons, 1955) pp267-8. 
2
 Note many spouses obtain a judicial separation and associated ancillary relief pursuant to the Family 
Law Act 1995 prior to obtaining a divorce. Given the broad similarities between the remedies on 
divorce and judicial separation, many of the issues highlighted in this article arise in both contexts. 
Moreover, the proposal delivered below could, with minimal tweaking, be adopted at both stages. 
However, a fuller discussion of the issues and challenges arising on judicial separation, specifically, is 
outside the scope of this article. 
3
 The financial proceedings which accompany divorce (or judicial separation) cases in Ireland are 
referred to as ‘ancillary relief’ proceedings. Note, in England, pursuant to the Family Procedure Rules 
2010, ‘ancillary relief’ cases have been retitled ‘financial remedy’ cases, see r 2.3 for interpretation.  
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the award of a decree of divorce,4 Part III of the legislation affords the courts ‘ground 
breaking’ redistributive powers.5 However, while the inclusion of these powers was 
‘essential … both to combat post-separation poverty and to vindicate spousal marital 
contributions’,6 the highly discretionary approach adopted in the 1996 Act has given rise to 
considerable difficulties at a practical level and doubts have been raised as to its 
appropriateness.7 In particular, serious concern has arisen in relation to the lack of 
consistency apparent in judicial outcomes to ancillary relief applications and the levels of 
uncertainty which exist for spouses seeking to reach a settlement. Moreover, the extent to 
which the current regime adequately protects financially weaker spouses appears 
questionable. 
Although in light of such concerns and given that marriage breakdown is a ‘significant social 
issue’ in Ireland,8 it might be expected that a statutory review would be commissioned, 
there has been no indication that any review or reform is on the legislative agenda. This 
reluctance to engage may, in part, be attributable to a mistaken belief as to the viability, or 
otherwise, of reform of the Irish ancillary relief system. Among the common misconceptions 
which exist is the belief that Irish law effectively prohibits the adoption of a more rule-
oriented approach to the provision of ancillary relief, particularly, in so far as such an 
approach would apply to matrimonial property, as well as an apparent failure to appreciate 
the diversity of rule-oriented schemes and their ability to retain important residual 
discretion. This article seeks to debunk these myths.  
The article begins by drawing on the most up-to-data empirical data highlighting the 
principal difficulties inherent in the Irish ancillary relief system as currently applied and 
placing the spotlight on the need for reform. It then considers the constitutional parameters 
which limit any change to the ancillary relief system applied before presenting a detailed 
proposal for reform. It concludes that although legislative change may be politically 
challenging, the commonly cited constitutional impediments to reform do not preclude the 
                                                          
4
 See Article 41.3.2° of the Irish Constitution.  
5
 LA Buckley, ‘Irish Matrimonial Property Division in Practice: A Case Study’ (2007) 21 Int’l JL Pol & Fam 
48.    
6
 LA Buckley, ‘Financial Provision on Relationship Breakdown in Ireland: A Constitutional Lacuna’ 
(2013) 36 DULJ 59, 60. 
7
 See Buckley, above n 5; L Crowley, 'Dividing the Spoils on divorce: rule-based regulation versus 
discretionary-based decision' (2012) Int’l FL 388. 
8
 Buckley, above n 5, p61. In 2012, 858 judicial separations were ordered and 2,892 divorces were 
ordered, see Court Service, ‘Annual Report 2012’ 
http://www.courts.ie/Courts.ie/library3.nsf/(WebFiles)/87BE463114EF96FF80257BA20033953B/$FILE
/Courts%20Service%20Annual%20Report%202012.pdf  [Accessed 28 April 2014] p49. 
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adoption of an alternative ancillary relief scheme. Instead, the article argues the adoption of 
a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision may better ensure the attainment 
of ‘proper provision’ in many cases and ought to be afforded serious consideration in 
Ireland. 
A critique of ancillary relief provision  on divorce in Ireland 
A defining feature of the ancillary relief system applied on divorce in Ireland is the way in 
which judicial freedom to determine the optimum outcome ‘dominates’ asset distribution.9 
Adopting an approach based on equitable redistribution, the judiciary are empowered to 
grant a wide range of financial and property orders (including maintenance, lump sum, 
property adjustment and pension adjustment orders) reallocating assets between spouses.10 
In choosing to exercise these powers they are afforded the widest possible latitude. The 
provisions of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 are, as Crowley notes, ‘replete with 
terminology that is designed to maximise the breadth of discretion available to the judiciary 
in providing for the parties’.11 Although pursuant to section 20 of the 1996 Act the judiciary 
are directed to a list of legislative factors which they may consider, the list is non-exhaustive 
and non-hierarchical with the factors operating simply as ‘guidelines’.12 Moreover, 
notwithstanding that the judiciary is directed to make ‘proper provision’ for divorcing 
spouses as a pre-condition to awarding a decree of divorce, Irish divorce law provisions are 
‘distinctly silent on the overriding aims of the legislation’13 and there exists an absence of 
legislative or judicially-developed principles guiding ancillary relief provision. The court is 
‘the ultimate and only adjudicator’ as to whether an asset ought to be divided and 
determines the ‘nature and scope of any order to be made’. 14  
In theory, it would appear such an approach is especially apt in determining ancillary relief 
provision on divorce. In the absence of rules or firm principles, the judiciary are afforded the 
freedom to achieve the optimum outcome in the individual circumstances and devise a 
bespoke package of relief for each couple. In reality, however, such strengths are merely 
illusory – few divorcing couples receive such judicial attention with only a small fraction of 
                                                          
9
 Crowley, above n 7, p395. 
10
 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, s 16. 
11
 Crowley, above n 7, p395. 
12
 L Crowley, Family Law (Dublin: Roundhall, 2013) p589 
13
 Crowley, above n 7, p396. 
14
 Ibid p395. 
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cases, perhaps even as low as 10%, contested in a full court hearing.15 Moreover, in 
circumstances where cases do proceed to a full hearing, serious difficulties have arisen in 
relation to consistency and foreseeability. As Parkinson observed, pursuant to such a highly 
discretionary system ‘judgments are often intuitive rather than reasoned, subjective rather 
than principled. And judges of experience and intellectual integrity will frequently vary 
widely in their intuitive sense of a just outcome, making prediction of the result 
precarious’.16 In an Irish context, this has proven especially apparent with similar cases 
frequently resulting in vastly different outcomes.17  
Evidence of inconsistency  
Having observed 1,087 unique cases between October 2008-February 2012 in the eight Irish 
Circuit Courts (where approximately 98% of divorce and judicial separations are heard) and 
having analysed 40 case files, O’ Shea recently reported high levels of inconsistency 
throughout the ancillary relief process.18 She noted child and spousal maintenance was 
calculated on ‘a highly discretionary, individualised assessment of evidence and 
submissions’,19 with ‘inconsistent child and spousal maintenance orders … the hallmark of 
maintenance applications in the Circuit Court’.20 She added, ‘During this project there was no 
evidence of any formulaic approach by the court, rather a rule of thumb pattern for each 
judge emerged’.21 Furthermore, property adjustments orders were made by most judges 
                                                          
15
 See Court Service, Family Law Matters (2007-2009) vol 1(1) 2 
www.courts.ie/courts.ie/library3.nsf/pagecurrent/DBF7DEC660A62D3880256DA60052BC9D?opendoc
ument&l=en [Accessed 21 June 2012]. Although the Court Service Annual Reports note considerably 
higher figures for full hearings, if one aspect of a case goes to full hearing, with all other issues, 
including property division and the destination of the family home settled, the case will be recorded 
as being disposed of with a full hearing and a settlement. Therefore, it is likely full hearings in relation 
to property continue to be quite low. For a detailed analysis of how, when and why people settle in 
England and Wales, see E Hitchings, J Miles and H Woodward, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: 
Understanding financial settlement on divorce (2013) 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/research/researchpublications/2013/assemblingthejigsawpuzzle.pdf 
[Accessed 08 October 2014]. 
16
 P Parkinson, ‘Reforming the Law of Family Property’ (1999) 13 AJFL 117.  
17
 See G Durcan SC, ‘Reimaging the Family Court System’ delivered at the Seminar on Family Law 
Courts 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Mr.%20Gerard%20Durcan,%20S.C..pdf/Files/Mr.%20Gerard%20Durca
n,%20S.C..pdf [Accessed 01 October 2014]. 
18
 R O’ Shea, Judicial Separation and Divorce in the Circuit Court (PhD Thesis, Waterford Institute of 
Technology, 2014) http://repository.wit.ie/2825/ [Accessed 29 September 2014]. 
19
 Ibid p131. 
20
 Ibid p131-132. 
21
 Ibid p131-132. 
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without reference to any starting point or presumption of equal sharing, rather dealt with on 
a ‘case by case basis’.22 As a result, she concluded:  
‘[T]he wide discretionary powers applied by the judiciary on separation and divorce, 
resulted in a considerable variation of approach and outcome. Rather than finding 
consistent decision making patterns, it was difficult to identify consistency of 
approach. The outcome was wholly dependent on the individual judge…’23  
Similar inconsistency was noted by Buckley in her research conducted in 2002 and based on 
an analysis of 89 case file questionnaires completed by 44 practicing family law solicitors.24 
She observed, ‘family property provisions are not being applied uniformly on a national 
basis. It seems clear that judges have different views on the provision that is “proper” in 
family situations, and that there are prevailing local trends’.25 In particular, having 
considered the outcomes of contested cases in Dublin, Cork and Galway, she noted the 
emerging differences ‘seemed sufficiently consistent to consider Cork judges likely to be 
more redistributive than judges in the other two venues’.26   
Effects of inconsistency 
Such a high level of inconsistency in relation to ancillary relief provision creates two serious 
problems. First, notwithstanding that it is a ‘clearly stated objective’ of the legislative 
scheme,27 it raises important questions as to the fairness of the approach. If consistency is, 
as Miles notes, itself ‘an aspect of fairness’,28 the Irish scheme, though clearly seeking ‘to 
prioritise the principle of fairness in the individual circumstances’,29 appears to be failing to 
attain this most important principle at a more general level. As Crowley explains:  
‘[W]hile Irish lawmakers might argue that the avoidance of strict rules facilitates the 
delivery of individualised justice and thus ultimately promises a greater likelihood of 
a fair outcome for the parties involved, equally it can be asserted that such an open-
                                                          
22
 Ibid p261. Of the 13 judges observed, only three clearly worked from the presumption of 50/50 
sharing.  
23
 Ibid p266.  
24
 Buckley, above n 5. Of the 44 solicitors, 13 were Legal Aid solicitors. Participating solicitors were 
invited to examine a number of their most recently completed divorce and separation files and to 
provide data for a detailed questionnaire. 
25
 Ibid p78.  
26
 Ibid p68.  
27
 T v T [2002] 3 IR 334 at 413 per Fennelly J. 
28
 J Miles, ‘Charman v Charman (No 4)–Making Sense of Need, Compensation and Equal Sharing after 
Miller/McFarlane’ (2008) 20 CFLQ 378, 387.  
29
 Crowley, above n 7, p397 (emphasis added). 
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ended system of regulation, lacking in principle and purpose, is excessively 
unbounded and simply operates to facilitate unfairness.’30 
The vagaries of the Irish ancillary relief scheme are highlighted especially clearly in the 
Dublin Circuit Family Court which has a number of sitting judges. There, one family law 
solicitor admitted, ‘When the legal diary goes on line each evening practitioners will eagerly 
check and be relieved or concerned depending on whether they act for the husband or the 
wife and see which judge is sitting for their case.’31 What provision is made between the 
spouses may vary quite substantially depending on how the case is scheduled. 
Second, at a practical level, the lack of consistency in the Irish scheme creates significant 
uncertainty for the vast majority of divorcing spouses who seek to reach a settlement. 
Admittedly, practitioner experience may mitigate the uncertainty to some extent where 
local judicial trends and preferences are well established. Indeed, Buckley noted on the basis 
of her research that knowledge of the presiding judge appears ‘crucial’ in Ireland.32 
However, she noted that this may not be ‘easy’ and ‘practitioners appearing outside their 
own locality are disadvantaged’.33 Furthermore, economic considerations result in a 
considerable portion of settlements being reached in the absence of any legal 
representation. Although recent data appears to suggest that the uptake of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution has been quite low in Ireland to date,34 it has nevertheless been 
highlighted that ‘a significant percentage of applicants or respondents’ are now self-
represented in family law proceedings.35  
In this context, it would seem the uncertainty inherent in the discretionary ancillary relief 
scheme applied weighs especially heavily on financially weaker spouses who appear to be in 
a particularly precarious bargaining position. As Scherpe has highlighted: ‘Where no rule is in 
                                                          
30
 Ibid p397. She adds at p400 that ‘inconsistent rulings in relatively in relatively similar circumstances 
cause immense dissatisfaction with the overall regime and can prompt discontent amongst those it 
seeks to regulate’. 
31




%20Board.pdf [Accessed 02 October 2014]. Note, the Law Commission for England and Wales, 
Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements (Law Comm No.434–2014) para3.5 noted its ‘concern’ 
over the inconsistency in that jurisdiction ‘particularly if it gives rise to “forum shopping”’. 
32
 Buckley, above n 5, p78.  
33
 Ibid 78.  
34
 O’ Shea, above n 18, p271 noted that in her research mediation was the only form of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution referred to in the courts and discovered it ‘is a very rare phenomenon at any stage 
of the process post the break-down of the marriage’. 
35
 Ibid p205. 
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place and the remedies are entirely at the discretion of the court, the burden falls on those 
who are arguing for sharing (or a greater share), compensation for marriage-related 
disadvantages, and even needs.’36 Yet, the ability to benefit from judicial discretion is often 
no more than a ‘theoretical possibility’.37 If a spouse choses to self-represent, the outcomes 
appear to be quite poor38 and, as Coulter has observed, ‘the capacity or otherwise of 
individual litigants to state their case cogently can have a bearing on the outcome of their 
cases’.39 However, the effect of represented litigation on costs has been described by one 
Irish judge as ‘a deterrent to any but the rich, the courageous and the foolhardy’.40 
Moreover, where legal representation is engaged in reaching a settlement, a premium is 
placed on the quality of the legal advice obtained and the experience and local knowledge of 
the retained solicitor. In this environment, where difficulties in accessing justice are 
combined with high levels of uncertainty, Parkinson observed, ‘The system ... is … weighted 
against the risk-averse and those who cannot afford to litigate. These people are at the 
mercy of the low “take-it-or-leave-it” offer.’41  
Finally, although it might be expected that the vulnerability of financially weaker spouses to 
such offers would be mitigated somewhat in Ireland by the constitutional pre-condition of 
‘proper provision’ for a decree of divorce, it appears again that judicial approaches to 
reviewing settlements and ensuring the pre-condition is satisfied are also highly 
inconsistent. Coulter observed on the basis of her empirical research conducted from 2007-
2009 in the Irish Circuit Courts that some judges considered a settlement made with legal 
advice automatically constituted proper provision.42 Similarly, Buckley noted that during her 
research judges ‘informally expressed their anxiety … not to disturb or investigate a 
                                                          
36
 J Scherpe, ‘Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective’ in J Scherpe (ed) 
Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2012) p476. In 
this regard, women are considered particularly vulnerable, see L Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 
(Free Press, 1985) pp310-318.  
37
 J Dewar, ‘Reducing Discretion in Family Law’ (1997) 11 AJFL 309.  
38
 See O’ Shea, above n 18, chapter 11.  
39
 C Coulter, Family Law in Practice: A Study of Cases in the Circuit Court (Dublin: Clarus Press, 2009) 
p106. 
40
 Peart J ‘Mediation – Alternative Dispute Resolution – the Future?’ (delivered to Mediation Solutions 
North West, 24 February 2012) (emphasis added). Therefore, while it is broadly considered that a low 
level of contested cases shows a well-operating system, the reality for many financially weaker 
spouses is that a court application is not an option due to the expense it involves. Although Legal Aid 
is still currently available to individuals whose disposable income is less than €18,000 in Ireland, many 
spouses in lower paid jobs will be ineligible, see Coulter, above n 39, p112. See also O’ Shea, above, n 
18, p206. 
41
 Parkinson, above n 16.  
42
 Ibid p94.  
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settlement unless manifestly inappropriate’.43 More recently, O’ Shea reported that while 
some judges ‘carefully examined’ the paperwork in consent cases and requested evidence to 
satisfy the constitutional requirements, others never heard evidence for consent cases in 
relation to ‘proper provision’.44  
Need for reform 
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the Irish legislature needs to rethink the 
current approach to ancillary relief provision adopted in Ireland. Despite Maine’s belief that 
rigidity is the mark of a primitive legal order,45 it is increasingly clear that a more rule-
oriented approach may be required to offset the significant shortcomings which have 
emerged in the equitable redistribution scheme applied.46 In direct contrast to the highly 
discretionary approach which currently prevails, the adoption of an alternative system 
incorporating a more rule-oriented flavour could, if framed appropriately, better promote 
consistency in judicial decision-making and better facilitate private ordering on divorce. The 
adoption of such a scheme would also strengthen the position of financially vulnerable 
spouses on divorce by establishing ‘actual rights in the property on behalf of both parties 
rather than the mere expectation that the court may divide the property in an equitable 
manner’.47 As a practical matter, as Brake observed, it would achieve ‘more desirable results 
in the vast majority of cases, while minimising the expenses involved in dividing property’.48 
However, before considering how such reform might be framed, the constitutional 
parameters within which any reform would take place must first be considered.  
Constitutional parameters  
                                                          
43
 Buckley, above n 5, p73 (emphasis added).  
44
 O’ Shea, above, n 18, pp92-3. While situations may arise which could operate to the detriment of 
the financially stronger spouse, such as where the financially stronger spouse's wish to divorce is 
more urgent thereby making them more vulnerable to a big pay-out, even there the financially 
stronger spouse may be aware of the judges tendency not to review settlements and work on this 
basis and/or the financially weaker spouse’s financial needs may simply prohibit them from pursuing 
the case to seek the exercise of judicial discretion. 
45
 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (1875) 63. 
46
 More predictability would be provided by the judicial development of clear principles, see L Crowley 
‘Irish Divorce Law in a Social Policy Vacuum – From the unspoken to the unknown’ (2011) 33(3) JSW& 
FL227 and Coulter, above n 39, p107. However, ideally, it is submitted more radical legislative reform 
would be preferable to ensure a coherent and comprehensive scheme exists.  
47
 SJ Brake, ‘Equitable Distribution vs Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the Uniform Marital 
Property Act’ (1982) 23(3) BCL Rev 761, 773. For arguments supporting a rule-oriented approach, see 
MA Glendon, ‘Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law’ (1985) 60 
Tul L Rev 1165. For a contrary view, see PG Harris, ‘Financial Orders after Divorce: A category error’ 
(2012) 42 Fam Law  860. 
48
 Brake, above n 47, p763.  
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Article 41.3.2° of the Irish Constitution demands ‘proper provision’ must be made for 
spouses and children as a pre-condition to the award of a decree of divorce. Therefore, the 
question arises: to what extent does this constitutional requirement preclude the 
introduction of a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision? Does the Article 
41.3.2° mandate individualised justice in all cases? On one hand it appears it might. After all, 
the terminology ‘proper provision’ was specifically chosen in the Constitution to pave the 
way for the introduction of the current equitable redistribution scheme.49 However, it is 
submitted it does not necessarily follow that the equitable redistribution scheme which was 
subsequently introduced on divorce is the only system of ancillary relief provision which is 
capable of fulfilling the constitutional pre-condition. Indeed, it may easily be doubted 
whether the constitutional pre-requisite of ‘proper provision’ is, in fact, currently being met 
in Ireland in many cases prior to the award of a decree of divorce.50 The adoption of a more 
rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief, on the other hand, could potentially ensure more 
fundamental protection, particularly to vulnerable, financially weaker spouses, than the 
current scheme and better meet the constitutional criterion in the majority of cases. 
Furthermore, although residual judicial discretion would certainly have to be retained to 
satisfy the constitutional limitation, the adoption of a more rule-oriented scheme would also 
promote greater judicial consistency and better facilitate the majority of divorcing spouses 
engaged in private bargaining.51 
The second issue which arises is the extent to which Ireland can introduce a more rule-
oriented approach to property division, specifically. Although it has long been argued that 
Ireland ought to adopt a rule-based approach to the division of property,52 the viability of 
such reform has been subject to considerable doubt.53 This uncertainty arose primarily due 
to the constitutional failure of the Matrimonial Home Bill 1993. Section 4 of the 1993 Bill 
provided that where a spouse was the sole owner of the matrimonial home on the 
                                                          
49
 For an overview of the historical development of ancillary relief provision in Ireland, see Crowley, 
above n 46.  
50
 See above. 
51
 Indeed the inclusion of some discretion is, in any case, preferable to rigid rules and flexibility is 
incorporated in some format in the ancillary relief scheme of almost every jurisdiction, see Crowley, 
above n 7 and Scherpe above n 36. Furthermore, it has been suggested that issues regarding the 
separation of powers could arise if the role of the judiciary is removed completely, see L Crowley, 
‘Equal versus Equitable Division of Marital Assets–What can be learned from the Experiences of Other 
Jurisdictions? Part II’ (2007) 10(2) IJFL 12.  
52
 See LA Buckley, ‘Matrimonial Property and Irish Law: A Case for Community’ (2002) 53 NILQ 39; 
Crowley, ibid; P O’ Connor, Key Issues in Irish Family Law (Dublin: Roundhall, 1988) pp201-214. 
53
 See Dáil Deb 23 March 1994, vol 440, cols 1097-1098 per Deputy McDowell. See also AJ Shatter, 
Family Law (Dublin: Butterworths, 4th edn, 1997) p839. 
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commencement date, or became a sole owner thereafter, the beneficial interest in the 
property would vest in both spouses as joint tenants. However, when referred to the 
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 26 of the Constitution, the Bill was unanimously held to 
be unconstitutional. Although the Supreme Court noted the social utility of such legislation, 
it found the Bill amounted to an unjustifiable and disproportionate interference with the 
decision-making rights of spouses.54 Consequently, a fear that any general rule in relation to 
the ownership or, by extension, the division of matrimonial property would fall foul of a 
constitutional challenge, gained traction.    
Nevertheless, such fears may be unduly pessimistic. Although clearly the adoption of an 
immediate community of property style approach would appear likely to require a further 
constitutional amendment to overcome the issues identified on the referral of the 
Matrimonial Home Bill, the adoption of a system operating on a deferred basis seems to 
pose no such threats.55 Assets would remain held on the basis of title while a marriage 
subsists – only on divorce would such assets be subject to division.56 While it may be argued 
that even the division of matrimonial property on divorce would constitute an unjustified 
intrusion on the autonomy of the family, such intrusion would be committed in the pursuit 
of making ‘proper provision’ for spouses, as constitutionally mandated by Article 41.3.2°: 
since property adjustments orders are accepted as constitutionally-sound on this basis, so 
too would the division of assets pursuant to a deferred community of property style 
scheme.57 
Additionally, although it might be suggested that the imposition of a rule of property division 
on divorce could be deemed an unjustified assault on the property rights of a wealthier 
spouse, this again cannot survive scrutiny. Pursuant to the current scheme, the property 
rights of a wealthier spouse are much more subject to attack with all property up for grabs 
and no limitation on the judiciary as to what inroads would be made on them.58  
                                                          
54
 See Article 40.1.1° of the Irish Constitution. 
55
 See L Crowley, ‘Equal versus Equitable Division of Marital Assets–What can be learned from the 
Experiences of Other Jurisdictions? Part I’ (2007) 10(1) IJFL 19 and Buckley, above n 52. 
56
 What the required triggering event(s) would be would be a matter for the legislature to specify. 
57
 See Buckley, above n 52, p71; Buckley, above n 6. 
58
 Note the legitimacy of the current redistributive powers was confirmed in TF v Ireland [1995] 1 IR 
321 and again in LB v Ireland [2006] IEHC 275, [2008] 1 IR 134. 
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A tentative proposal for reform59 
In seeking to reform the highly discretionary ancillary relief scheme currently applied in 
Ireland, broad proposals advocating the incorporation of rules or quasi-rules for the sharing 
of property have received considerable support at a theoretical level.60 However, 
notwithstanding that the introduction of a more rule-oriented approach to property division 
would appear to be a viable option for reform if framed correctly, and would certainly 
represent a welcome development in Irish law, it is clear that such reform would, without 
more, be unlikely to afford sufficient protection for financially weaker spouses, notably 
women. 
It is increasingly evident that the application of a strict equal (property) division rule can, in 
fact, sometimes lead to the further impoverishment of women, worsening their condition in 
respect of men and widening the income gap between the genders.61 In particular, such an 
approach may provide an insufficient remedy to counteract the economic disparity which 
often exists between spouses at the point of divorce. Unfortunately, it appears such a threat 
is especially acute in Ireland. Recent research which analysed work patterns of male and 
female partners in couple households (including though not limited to married couples), 
highlighted that despite the shift away from the traditional male breadwinner work pattern, 
characterised by male partner full-time work and female partner joblessness or part-time 
work, the male breadwinner model continued to exist in 38% of couple households.62 
Female breadwinner households, although increased, were much less common and only 
recorded in 9% of couple households.63 Crucially, the financially inferior position of many 
women arising from this reduced labour market participation is compounded by the 
considerable challenges they face when seeking to return to the workforce, particularly after 
a period of full-time caring, and the negative effect this reduced participation has on their 
                                                          
59
 Although this proposal draws inspiration from a number of sources, most notably past and present 
regimes applied in British Columbia, Canada (see the Family Relations Act 1996 and the Family Law 
Act 2011) the proposal is novel and does not replicate any existing regime. 
60
 See above n 52.  
61
 For an early argument to this effect, see L Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (Free Press, 1985) 
pp70-109. Although in the interim her statistics have been subject to some criticism, Crowley, above n 
7, p391 notes ‘it appears well-established that the economic consequences of divorce are significantly 
worse for long-term homemakers and their children than they are for the breadwinner spouse’. See 
also L Weitzman and M Maclean (eds), Economic Consequences or Divorce (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992). 
62
 F McGinnity, H Russell, D Watson, G Kingston & Elish Kelly, Winners and Losers? The Equality Impact 
of the Great Recession in Ireland (Dublin: Equality Authority and the Economic and Social Research 
Institute, 2014) p27. This research drew on the findings of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
for 2010. 
63
 Ibid p27.  
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earning capacity.64 Thus, to ensure a more substantively equal economic outcome on 
divorce than mere equal property sharing would permit,65 wider issues such as spousal 
support must also be considered in devising any scheme for reform.  
At present, Ireland adopts what Scherpe describes as a ‘holistic’ or ‘package’ approach to 
ancillary relief.66 No clear distinction exists between division of property, spousal support 
and other financial remedies on divorce –  the remedies ‘are not determined individually, 
but seen as a coherent whole, so the outcome is a “package solution” aiming at the overall 
objective of… “proper provision”’.67 A desire to meet spousal needs or to compensate 
financially weaker spouses for relationship-generated loss is often indistinguishable from any 
notions of sharing or partnership in the overall financial and/or property settlement 
ordered. Where such issues are mingled, however, it can lead to a lack of clarity for spouses 
as to the basis on which provision has been made, sometimes resulting in considerable 
dissatisfaction with the outcome68 and fuelling uncertainty. Furthermore, in an Irish context, 
it seems to result in the outward prioritisation of need in many cases while simultaneously 
eclipsing any notion of entitlement on the basis of partnership or joint efforts.  
However, there is an increasingly strong argument that issues of spousal support ought, as a 
de fault, to be dealt with separate from property division, at both a conceptual and practical 
level. As was highlighted in Canada 25 years ago:  
‘Requiring that [the need for economic independence and self-sufficiency] be taken 
into account when dividing family property blurs the distinction between property 
                                                          
64
 Ibid p11. The ‘strong negative effects’ of the presence of pre-school children on the probability of 
participation of the mother continue to be observed, see H Russell, F McGinnity, T Callan and C Keane, 
A Woman’s Place: Female Participation in the Irish Labour Market (Dublin: Equality Authority and 
Economic and Social Research Institute, 2012), p39. As Miles, above n 28, p391 explained, ‘formal 
equality … neglects the parties’ respective earning capacities - 50% plus substantial earning power is 
self-evidently better than 50% and no earning power.’ 
65
 Or perhaps is currently achieved.  
66
 Scherpe, above n 36, p476.  
67
 Ibid p476. 
68
 See SD v BD [2007] IEHC 492 and T v T [2002] IESC 68. See also E Moore, ‘The Significance of “Home-
maker” Contributions upon Divorce’ (2007) 10(1) IJFL 15 who noted that although ‘the judiciary 
recognises the role of the women in the home, this recognition has different implications for women 
with different levels of education. The beneficiaries were women who were in a position to adopt a 
professional working life. However, women with fewer educational advantages, who will remain in 
the home after marital breakdown, are not rewarded equally by the judiciary.’ Therefore, poorer 
outcomes for home-makers appeared to be attributed to a failure to value domestic contributions 
rather than issues connected with relationship-generated loss and compensation. 
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rights and maintenance obligations. One may easily question whether [this factor] 
has any relevance in determining entitlement to property.’69  
Moreover, as Scherpe and Miles note, the European Union Maintenance Regulation may 
push jurisdictions currently adopting a ‘holistic perspective’ to financial orders on divorce, 
such as Ireland, to consider ‘a more explicitly principled/pillared approach’ akin to that 
applied in civil law continental Europe and adopted in varying formats in a number of 
common law jurisdictions.70  
Whatever the impetus for reform, it is arguable that the incorporation of clear and distinct 
‘pillars’ of relief would provide greater transparency to divorcing spouses in Ireland. It 
would, furthermore, potentially provide a more solid framework within which court orders 
and, particularly, private settlements could be reached in the run-of-the-mill cases. In this 
manner, such an approach would simultaneously promote greater consistency in judicial 
decision-making, better facilitate private ordering and, if framed correctly, strengthen the 
position of financially weaker spouses. In this proposal, three discrete pillars are considered: 
property sharing, spousal support and allocation of the family home. 
Property sharing  
The development of a more rule-oriented approach to property division at the point of 
divorce would be welcome in Ireland, from both a practical and a symbolic perspective. In 
addition to vesting financially weaker spouses with an entitlement to a share of family assets 
and providing much greater predictability, the adoption of pre-defined equal sharing would 
give greater effect to the view that marriage is a partnership and better recognise the joint 
efforts of the couple. In devising what assets ought to be captured in the community for 
sharing, these rationales must be reflected. However, other needs must also be considered 
in determining how the community for sharing ought to be classified. In particular, the need 
                                                          
69
 British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Property Rights on Marriage Breakdown (Working Paper 
No. 63–1989) IV(B)(5)(a).  
70
 J Scherpe and J Miles ‘Property and Financial Support between spouses’ in J Eekelaar and R George 
(eds) Routeledge Handbook of Family Law and Policy (Oxford: Routledge 2014) p145 referring to 
Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 which was transposed into Irish law with European Communities 
(Maintenance) Regulations 2011. For more, see Crowley, above n 12, pp767-773. For an overview of 
how such a pillared approach operates in practice, see A Dutta, ‘Germany’ in Scherpe (ed) above n 36, 
pp158-200, especially pp158-166. To some extent, a similar approach also seems to apply in certain 
Canadian provinces, see for instance the Family Law Act 2011 applied in British Columbia. 
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for simplicity and clarity: divorcing spouses need to know, in the simplest terms, what assets 
fall into the community to be divided.71  
Prioritising simplicity and clarity while broadly reflecting the rationales of partnership and 
joint efforts, a community of acquests model has considerable appeal. All assets acquired 
during the marriage are shared, except those received by gift or inheritance – pre-acquired 
assets are not subject to division. Through such a model, clear lines may be drawn 
delineating what assets are subject to sharing and which are not. However, despite its 
simplicity and apparent popularity,72 such an approach is not without its shortcomings. In its 
purest format, pursuant to such a regime, joint contributions are presumed to merit equal 
sharing in all cases, with no regard to the duration of the relationship or even the existence 
of such contributions. Moreover, the family home, though central to the marital partnership, 
may be excluded if pre-acquired, gifted or inherited. From an Irish matrimonial property 
perspective, in particular, such a limitation would appear unacceptable.73 It is at least 
arguable, therefore, that a more nuanced and complex approach to asset categorisation may 
be required to better reflect the rationales for sharing advanced.  
One way in which greater theoretical consistency might be achieved would be by viewing 
the rationales as distinct and independent with each justifying the sharing of two different 
categories of assets. The entitlement to a share in one category of assets might arise as a 
consequence of marriage (reflecting partnership), while the rationale for sharing another 
category of assets might be contribution-based (reflecting joint efforts). What constitutes a 
‘family asset’, shared as a consequence of marriage, could perhaps be determined by a 
functional test based on whether the asset was ordinarily used for a family purpose.74 
Pursuant to such an approach, and as befits its special position in other areas of Irish 
matrimonial property law, the family home would automatically fall within this category.75 
                                                          
71
 These influencing factors were clearly implied in the Law Commission for England and Wales report, 
above n 31, Chapter 8.  
72
 For a list of Civil law jurisdictions adopting such an approach, see Scherpe, above n 36, p449. A 
similar scheme is also applied in a number of US states and Canadian provinces and was mooted by 
the Law Commission for England and Wales,  Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements  - A 
supplementary consultation paper (SCP No. 208–2012). 
73
 See below. 
74
 A similar category of assets is also subject to sharing in Austria, Singapore, New Zealand and, albeit 
to a lessor extent, Scotland, see Scherpe, above n 36.  
75
 Special protection is already afforded to the family home by s 56 of the Succession Act 1965 which 
allows for the appropriation of the home by the surviving spouse on the death of the owner-spouse in 
certain circumstances and s 3 of the Family Home Protection Act which restricts the unilateral 
disposition of the home, see below. See also Law Commission for England and Wales, above n 31, 
para8.32.  
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Moreover, building on recent studies in England and Wales which have shown that how 
money is held and under whose name is not necessarily determinative of the intentions of 
the parties’, bank accounts used for a family purpose would also be shared.76 The date or 
method of acquisition of these assets would be irrelevant as it is contended that ordinarily 
using property for a family purpose demonstrates the central importance of the asset to the 
martial partnership and is subject to division on that basis.  
Notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, however, such an approach has faced opposition in 
recent times.77 One of the key concerns which has been raised is that such a scheme could 
cause spouses to shield assets from use to prevent their sharing should the marriage 
flounder. However, it is submitted that by specifying certain assets which are considered to 
be at the heart of the matrimonial consortium and which will be presumptively subject to 
sharing, such as the family home, in the majority of cases such shielding will be irrelevant – 
in the ‘average’ case, the core assets of the partnership will be captured automatically within 
the community for sharing. A second issue which has been raised is that difficulties could be 
encountered in the application of a functional test for characterising such assets. Despite 
this, it is arguable that many of these problems could be offset at the outset through the 
inclusion of legislative guidelines to aid in the identification process. The guidelines could 
specify the date on which an asset ought to be characterised and when the asset ought to be 
valued. They could also provide guidance in relation to the length of ‘use’ required and what 
it might consist of, what would happen where there is more than one function of the 
property or where there is an unrealized intention. The onus of proof could, moreover, be 
placed on the person claiming that the asset in question is not a family asset. 
In the second category of community assets, where direct or indirect contributions such as 
savings through effective management of household or child rearing responsibilities are 
made by the non-owning spouse, business assets and/or pensions could be recharacterised 
as ‘quasi-family assets’ subject to division.78 To avoid confusion, and developing on the 
legislative equalisation of contributions effected in the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, the 
                                                          
76
 C Burgoyne and S Sonnenberg, ‘Financial Practices in Cohabiting Heterosexual Couples: A 
Perspective from Economic Psychology’ in J Miles and R Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets 
(Hart Publishing 2009). It is likely similar trends would be evident in Ireland. 
77
 See Law Commission for England and Wales, above n 31, paras8.51-8.56.  
78
 This would appear to reflect current Irish policy. Crowley, above n 12, p631 notes: ‘The courts have 
shown themselves willing to make orders in respect of a business or farm owned by one spouse, or at 
least award a share of the value of the business to the non-owning spouse based on the spousal 
contributions in the course of the marriage.’ Vis-à-vis pensions, see O’ Shea, above n18, p69. A similar 
test was applied in British Columbia, Canada pursuant to s 59(2) of the Family Relations Act 1996. 
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legislation could include an explicit statement that work in the home creates a rebuttable 
presumption that an indirect contribution was made to the pension/business.79  In this 
category, if the asset was acquired before marriage or was a gift or inheritance, it is arguable 
that only the increased value of the asset ought to be subject to division.80 In addition, 
reflecting the fact that ‘the actual value of most non-pecuniary contributions, especially 
homemaking, is implicitly linked to duration’,81 the sharing of quasi-family assets pursuant to 
such a system could be subject to temporal accretion.82 Drawing on empirical research 
elsewhere in support of such an approach,83 the regime could be tailored to ensure equal 
sharing of quasi-family assets would only be achieved after five years of marriage with a 
spouse accruing a 10% share each year until the fifth year. The main benefits of adopting 
such a scale would be to minimise the applications to court for a departure from equal 
sharing where the marriage was short on the basis that equal sharing is unfair and, 
simultaneously, to retain certainty in the default rules.  
Notwithstanding their presumptive application, however, it is arguable that residual judicial 
discretion ought to be retained to allow for departures from these ‘rules’ where necessary. 
To this end, building on the fundamental distinction in the rationales for sharing family and 
quasi-family assets, clear and justifiable grounds for departing from equal sharing may be 
designed to respond to situations where a reapportionment of shares may be appropriate.84 
For instance, in order to avoid the danger of assuming domestic contributions are in every 
case equal, quasi-family assets ought to be subject to reapportionment where the temporal 
                                                          
79
 No link would need to be evidenced between the actual indirect contributions and the business. 
However, contributions would be subject to the de minimus principle. 
80
 The exclusion of such assets is ‘becoming increasingly common in common law jurisdictions’, see J 
Scherpe and J Miles in Eekelaar and George (eds) above n 70, p144. Moreover, in an Irish context, 
inheritance can be a factor in whether or not assets ought to be divided, see C v C [2005] IEHC 276, 
although it is usually only relevant where assets exceed needs. 
81
 J Eekelaar, ‘Asset Distribution on Divorce–Time and Property’ (2003) Fam Law 828.  
82
 Having an incremental scale (for quasi-family assets) would seem to fit with the approach of the 
Irish courts as identified by O’ Shea, above n 18, p121 where she noted ‘The Circuit Court did 
generally recognise the contributions of the wife, in accordance with Article 41.2.1., where there were 
children and a long-term marriage.’ Note, although this approach would also fit with the contribution-
based rationale for sharing assets pursuant to this proposal, it would not be appropriate in the sharing 
of family assets which is justified by the partnership view of marriage. 
83
 See E Cooke, A Barlow and T Callus, Community of Property: A regime for England and Wales? 
(Nuffield Foundation, 2006) p34-38.  
84
 Somewhat similarly, albeit in reverse, see s 9 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 which expressly 
identifies statutory criteria which must be satisfied in order to justify making any financial order as 
discussed in Crowley, above n 7, pp391-394. 
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accretion model gives rise to a result which is ‘clearly unfair’ having regard, for instance, to 
the extent of the contributions made.85  
The inclusion of an explicit rationale for sharing may also be used to justify not departing 
from equal sharing in certain circumstances. If the entitlement to equal shares of family or 
quasi-family assets is afforded on the basis that it gives effect to the partnership rationale or 
in recognition of contributions, the reapportionment of such assets on the basis of a spousal 
‘need’, at least as a de fault measure, might not appear appropriate. Nevertheless, given the 
broad gamut of family situations which exist, residual discretion ought, perhaps, to be 
vested in the judiciary to divide any assets (community assets or otherwise) where not to do 
so would, again, be ‘clearly unfair’ having regard to specified criteria.86 
Admittedly, a dual-categorisation approach such as that proposed here does not represent 
the most straightforward method of categorising assets falling into the community for 
sharing and undoubtedly prioritises the need for theoretical consistency at the expense of 
simplicity. However, although more user-friendly approaches do exist, notably the 
community of acquests regime, such a model can be both over- and under-inclusive. The 
adoption of the approach presented here, by contrast, would better ensure justifiable 
grounds for sharing, and departures therefrom, are established. It would, moreover, when 
used in conjunction with proposed guidelines, better facilitate consistent judicial decision-
making where sought and represent a more transparent approach to asset division.87  
Finally, while it is submitted that spouses ought to be capable of contracting out of any such 
regime on obtaining independent legal advice,88 the constitutional pre-condition of ‘proper 
provision’ for a decree of divorce would require that where an opt out is availed of, the 
                                                          
85
 See E Cooke, ‘Miller/McFarlane: Law in Search of Discrimination’ (2007) 19 CFLQ 98, 101. However, 
it is submitted in most cases such contributions would be considered equal.  
86
 What these criteria are would have to be carefully considered and would, no doubt, be reflective of 
the overall policy direction of any such reform. One ground for departure which is included in a 
number of jurisdictions is if there was a considerable disparity in the value of the assets held by each 
spouse at the end of the relationship. 
87
 Although the scope of the community for sharing might, in larger value cases, appear somewhat 
conservative, it is submitted that such an approach is more in line with the development of 
matrimonial property law in Ireland to date which has been built on incremental progress towards 
entitlement-based provision. For general discussion of the movement of family law from a welfare 
based approach to an entitlement based approach, see Eekelaar, above n 81.  
88
 An opt-out clause is already in place in Irish matrimonial property law as it is possible to contract 
out of an entitlement to the legal right share, see s 113 of the Succession Act 1965. 
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current equitable redistribution scheme would once again come into play to ensure such 
provision is made for a dependent spouse.89 
Spousal support 
The second issue or ‘pillar’ which must be considered is that of spousal support. As noted, it 
has become increasingly apparent that mere equal sharing of assets often proves insufficient 
to respond to the economic vulnerability of financially weaker spouses on divorce and may 
fail to ensure an economically just outcome is achieved. Where the economic vulnerability of 
one spouse, often the wife, arises by virtue of the greater workload taken on in the home 
and in caring for children, it ought, in particular, to be addressed.90  
Therefore, the question arises: if spousal support ought to be considered separately from 
issues of property division, how should it be calculated? In determining such issues and 
establishing for how long such support might endure, there has been a trend across the 
common law world towards the adoption (or at least investigation) of guidelines or formulae 
based on income-sharing rather than an individualised assessment of need. To this end, the 
approach adopted in Canada represents an especially attractive template.  
Pursuant to the federal Divorce Act 1985, Canadian courts are empowered to make orders 
for spousal support.91 In this regard, a ‘fairly open-ended’ approach is adopted in 
determining issues relating to entitlement, amount and duration of such support.92 Although 
section 15.2(6) enumerates four objectives for spousal support,93 ‘[m]uch of the real work of 
determining spousal support awards is left to judicial interpretation’.94 However, by the turn 
of this century it was increasingly clear the broad discretion vested in the court had resulted 
in spousal support law which was ‘confused, uncertain and controversial’, with lawyers and 
                                                          
89
 For discussion of the current Irish position on pre-nuptial agreements, see L Crowley, ‘Ireland’ in 
Scherpe (ed) above n 36,  pp200-229; Crowley, above n12, pp567-573; LA Buckley, ‘Ante-nuptial 
Agreements and “Proper Provision”: An Irish Response to Radmacher v Granatino’ (2011) 14(1) IJFL 3.  
90
 See I Ellman, ‘The Theory of Alimony’ (1989) 77 Cali LR 1. 
91
 Pursuant to s 91(2) of the Constitution Act 1867, marriage and divorce are within federal 
jurisdiction in Canada. 
92
 C Rogerson and R Thompson, ‘The Canadian Experiment with Spousal Support Guidelines’ (2011-12) 
45 Fam L Q 241, 246. 
93
 Spousal support orders ought to: ‘(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the 
spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (b) apportion between the spouses any financial 
consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the 
support of any child of the marriage; (c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the 
breakdown of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of 
each spouse within a reasonable period of time’. 
94
 Rogerson and Thompson, above n 92, p247. 
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judges ‘desperate for guidance’ in what had become ‘one of the most difficult areas’ in 
Canadian legal practice at the time.95 
Reacting to the widespread confusion, the Department of Justice commenced a research 
project in 2001 investigating the possibility of introducing guidelines to better clarify the 
position in relation to spousal support.96 The final version of the Spousal Support Advisory 
Guidelines (SSAG) was subsequently published in July 2008 with the guidelines introduced 
on a non-legislative basis.97 Based on an income-sharing formula, and devised having regard 
to dominant patterns in typical cases in the jurisdiction, the SSAG have been described as 
‘the most ambitious and comprehensive scheme of spousal support guidelines to have been 
implemented to date in the common law world’.98  
Reflecting both the ‘merger over time’ theory as well as compensatory and non-
compensatory (needs-based) principles,99 cases are categorised by whether or not there are 
dependent children and a formula is then applied. Where there are no dependent children, 
the principal contributing factors are the length of the marriage and the income differential 
between the spouses.100 By contrast, where there are dependent children and thus child 
support obligations, additional factors intervene including the age of the children and the 
length of the post-divorce child-rearing period. When computed, a financial range within 
which spousal support ought to fall is extracted.101 However, discretion also remains to 
depart from the ranges produced where certain specified ‘exceptions’ apply.102  
                                                          
95
 C Rogerson, Developing Spousal Support Guidelines in Canada: Beginning the Discussion (Dec 2002), 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/ss-pae/index.html [Accessed 08 January 
2015]. See also M Gordon, ‘Spousal Support Guidelines and the American Experience: Moving Beyond 
Discretion’ (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 247. Much of this confusion arose from the conflicting decisions of 
Pelech v Pelech [1987] 1 SCR 801; Moge v Moge [1992] 3 SCR 813; and Bracklow v Bracklow [1999] 1 
SCR 420. 
96
 The guidelines were the result of a seven year project directed by Prof Carol Rogerson and Prof 
Rollie Thompson. 
97
 See the Department of Justice Canada, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (July 2008) 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/spag/pdf/SSAG_eng.pdf [Accessed 02 
October 2014]. 
98
 C Rogerson, ‘Child support, spousal support and the turn to guidelines’ in Eekelaar and George (eds) 
above n 70, p159.  
99
 For a detailed discussion of the various principles which may underpin spousal support provision, 
see Law Commission for England and Wales, above n 31, chapter 3. 
100
 The amount and duration of support increases incrementally with the length of the marriage.  
101
 The need for software causes specific problems for those litigants who do not have legal 
representation. However, solutions are being sought as noted in Rogerson and Thomson, above n 92, 
p266, however it is hoped free online software will become available to complete these calculations. 
102
 These may include illness, disability, disproportionate losses or gains in a short marriage, et cetera. 
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Despite their non-legislative status, the SSAG have proven remarkably successful. The 
guidelines, which recognise ‘a very generous basis for spousal support’,103 are now ‘widely 
accepted and used by both lawyers and judges across the country’.104 The guidelines have 
facilitated the development of more consistent judicial decision-making and by identifying  
‘outliers’ – decisions deemed ‘at odds with nationwide trends’ which had formerly been 
‘covered’ by the wide discretion afforded to the judiciary – has effectively exposed such 
outcomes ‘forcing change or explanation’.105 The introduction of the SSAG also appears to 
have been particularly useful in better ensuring adequate provision for financially vulnerable 
spouses and reducing, where possible, the damaging economic consequences of divorce.106 
It has been observed, ‘[i]n some areas where spousal support awards were noticeably lower 
and out of keeping with general patterns across the country, the SSAG have raised the level 
of awards’.107 It is also clear that ‘lawyers for lower-income recipients now make spousal 
support claims, when they might not have in the past, as the courts will generally award at 
least the low end of the ranges with little need for sophisticated argument’.108 Moreover, 
the scheme goes a long way towards shaping client expectations and framing 
negotiations.109 Considering the merits of the Canadian guidelines, as well as the equivalent 
American Law Institute recommendations on spousal support,110 it has been observed: 
                                                          
103
 Rogerson and Thompson, above n 92, p242. 
104
 Rogerson, above n 98, p162. Only 8 months after the release of a draft version of the guidelines in 
2005, they were described as a ‘useful tool’ by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, one of the 
largest provinces in Canada, see Yemchuk v Yemchuck [2005] BCCA 406 per Prowse J. For a recent 
analysis of the guidelines, see R Thompson ‘To Vary, To Review, Perchance to Change: Changing 
Spousal Support’ (2012) 31 Canadian Fam L Q 355.  
105
 Rogerson and Thompson, above n 92, p263. 
106
 Note, it has been observed, ‘Canadian law has been shaped by the public policy goal of 
ameliorating the negative economic consequences of separation and divorce experienced primarily by 
women and children.’ C Rogerson, ‘Child and Spousal Support in Canada: The Guidelines Approach 
Part 2’ (2012) 1 IJFL 18. For a clear exposition of the challenges faced by women on divorce in Canada, 
see R Leckey, ‘Families in the Eyes of the Law: Contemporary Challenges and the Grip of the Past’ 
(research paper prepared for the Institute for Research on Public Policy) http://irpp.org/research-
studies/choices-vol15-no8/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]. Similar challenges appear to exist in Ireland, 
see above. 
107
 Rogerson, above n 106.  
108
 Rogerson and Thompson, above n 92, p262. Prior to the introduction of the guidelines, it was 
observed: ‘The lack of certainty, predictability and consistency in the law, not to mention realities 
such as clients’ limited resources, lack of legal aid and personal circumstances such as an imbalance in 
bargaining power, made spousal support claims frequently unadvisable or impractical in some 
regions.’ See Canadian Bar Association, ‘Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines’ (May 2007) 
https://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/07-29-eng.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2015] p2. 
109
 For a full analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the SSAG, see Rogerson and Thompson, 
above n 92. 
110
 The Canadian guidelines are preferred here to the American Law Institute’s equivalent due to the 
more flexible format of the former, see American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (2002). For example, the Canadian guidelines result in a 
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‘These approaches to the quantification of spousal support … offer a very useful tool for 
parties seeking to settle their cases out of court’.111 As the Law Commission for England and 
Wales explained in its 2014 Report on Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, such a 
formulaic approach ensures ‘parties can negotiate, knowing at least that they are “on the 
right lines”’.112  
Cognisant of these practical benefits, it is submitted that the Irish legislature ought to also 
seriously consider adopting such an approach, ideally at a statutory level.113 Similar 
guidelines, founded on equivalent research as to the range of appropriate outcomes in the 
jurisdiction, would be especially welcome in providing more robust protection to vulnerable 
financially weaker spouses while simultaneously presenting a more transparent, consistent 
and settlement-friendly approach to spousal support.114 In determining what precise 
guidelines ought to be adopted, ‘trade-offs between simplicity and efficiency, on the one 
hand, and more finely tuned justice on the other hand’115 would, necessarily, be required. 
However, the adoption of a more formulaic approach premised on the provision of ranges of 
outcomes, with the simultaneous retention of judicial discretion to achieve a different 
outcome where appropriate, would avoid the charge that such prescribed formulae are too 
rigid while nonetheless ensuring that settlements may be better reached in the shadow of 
the law.116  
Unlike England and Wales, such an approach founded on the provision of on-going support 
would be in line with current judicial practice in Ireland. A principle of ‘clean break’, which 
                                                                                                                                                                      
suitable range of outcomes while the American Law Institute guidelines produce a single figure 
outcome. 
111
 Scherpe and Miles, above n 70, p149. 
112
 Law Commission for England and Wales, above n 31, para.1.29. 
113
 Although in Canada, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines are non-statutory in nature, they 
have received appellate court approval and are widely applied. However, in an Irish context, it is 
suggested that given the cautious approach adopted by the judiciary vis-à-vis ancillary relief and the 
attachment of many of the judiciary to wide ranging discretion, it would be better to have such 
guidelines on a statutory basis   
Note also O’Higgins J in MP v AP [2005] IEHC 326 did note ‘although the maintenance agreed between 
the parties was adequate, it would be wrong to ignore the huge disparity in income between the 
parties’ (emphasis added).  
114
 O’ Shea, above n 18, p510 found that where an on-going payment was made, 60% had €50/wk 
spousal maintenance, suggesting trends may be apparent in the courts. Moreover, the inclusion of 
guidelines akin to those in Canada, incorporating the ‘merger over time’ theory, notably where there 
are no children, would fit with the temporal accretion model proposed for quasi-family assets. 
115
 Rogerson, above n98, p157. 
116
 The incorporation of such a formulaic approach would also counteract the difficulties observed in 
O’ Shea, above n 18, p132 where it was noted that the ‘over-riding basis of evaluation’ for child and 
spousal maintenance was ‘the need of the primary carer of dependent children of the marriage’ with 
no attempt made to balance the needs of payor spouse with dependent spouse. 
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promotes the cessation of financial ties between spouses, does not currently exist in the 
jurisdiction and the Irish judiciary have, in many cases, actively discouraged any such 
development.117 Notwithstanding the viability of such on-going support, however, periodical 
payments might not be appropriate or desirable for former spouses in every case. 
Consequently, while the above scheme would provide much greater clarity in the 
quantification of spousal support, where spousal support is inappropriate, perhaps due the 
possibility of non-compliance or a desire for clean break, it is strongly suggested that it ought 
to be possible to convert spousal support into an interest in property or lump sum payment. 
This could give rise to an unequal division of assets, notably the family home, albeit not by 
virtue of a reapportionment per se but rather a reconfiguration of the overall package.118 
Family home 
Once issues in relation to property division and spousal support have been resolved, it is 
then often necessary to determine how the actual assets are divided, whether the family 
home is to be sold or, if not, to whom the property is allocated. In this regard, it is highly 
possible a dispute may arise. Indeed, in supporting a form of deferred community of 
property, Buckley noted, ‘The most worrying issue relates to children, as an equal division of 
assets may preclude the retention of the family home by the primary carer’.119 To avoid this 
injustice, it is submitted that the powers currently vested in the Irish judiciary including the 
power to grant exclusive occupation of the home and defer its sale should continue. In this 
regard, and reflecting the current legislative stance, the first priority ought to be the needs 
of the dependent spouse and children.120 This would represent a practical method of 
responding to needs,121 especially where resources are limited, and would accord with the 
                                                          
117
 See JD V DD [1997] 3 IR 64. See also Murray J in T v T [2002] 3 IR 334 at 407. However, see G v G 
[2011] IESC 40 where the Supreme Court noted that although ‘Irish law does not establish a right to a 
“clean break” …. it is a legitimate aspiration’. 
118
 This ability to reconfigure the overall package is important in light of empirical evidence which 
demonstrates the desire of many Irish couples to include some element of clean break, by capitalising 
the value of the support or pension payments or converting such relief into an interest in property 
where possible, see Courts Service, above n 15. See also Buckley, above n 5. Such ‘restructuring’ is 
also possible in Canada, see Rogerson, above n106.  
119
 Above n 52, p74. This fear was also highlighted by Dewar, above n37, p309. 
120
 See Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, s 15(2)(b). 
121
 Where there are dependent children, the award of exclusive occupation, as Miles notes, is really 
‘an aspect of provision for the child rather than for the spouse’, see Law Commission for England and 
Wales, above n 31, para3.45. Where there are no children, but a spouse wishes to remain in the 
home, such an order could be made in full or partial satisfaction of the recipient spouse’s 
entitlements under the proposal. In order to ensure an accurate valuation of the benefit arising from 
the order, actuarial calculations would have to take place. Alternatively, if such an order was made in 
addition to the spousal support and property entitlements of the recipient spouse, and not as part of 
a reconfigured package, it would represent additional provision on the basis of need. 
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clear popularity of such orders in the Irish courts.122 Although such an approach would again 
vest discretion with the judiciary, the inclusion of a welfare objective ought, in theory, to 
ensure a clear line of authority emerging from the courts which would in turn lend itself to 
facilitating separation agreements and post-separation arrangements for the family home.  
Should residual discretion vest in the court? 
While the adoption of the scheme presented here, or a variant thereof, would ensure a 
more comprehensive, transparent and, ideally, consistent approach to financial provision 
and property division on divorce, it is still possible that given the great variety of family 
circumstances which exist the overall suite of entitlements and remedies may not achieve 
economic justice in certain outlier cases. Therefore, it is arguable that residual discretion 
ought to reside in the judiciary to adjust the overall provision made between spouses 
pursuant to the above regime. To this end, a number of objectives of the overall regulatory 
process may be enumerated against which financial and property settlements are, at the 
final stage, judged.123 Where these objectives are not met, discretion may be exercised to 
achieve more individualised justice. 
What these objectives ought to be will naturally be a matter of debate and policy choice. 
Although the adoption of a formulaic spousal support scheme such as that suggested here 
involves a relatively strong compensatory element, given the somewhat mechanical nature 
of such an approach, it may be felt that residual judicial discretion ought to be retained to 
ensure the regime effectively achieves this goal where required. Moreover, while an 
ancillary relief regime such as that proposed emphasizes the role of the payee as a deserving 
claimant rather than a ‘needy supplicant’, and notwithstanding the desire to prioritise 
compensation over need which has emerged in academic literature,124 it is arguable that (for 
both practical and political purposes) limited residual discretion may also be required to be 
vested in the judiciary to respond in certain cases to need not captured by spousal support 
nor offset by the entitlements provided. As a result, the inclusion of both need and 
compensation-based objectives may be considered necessary.  
Advantages of the proposal  
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 O’ Shea, above n 18, p175. Crowley, above n 12, p632 notes ‘it is well settled that where there are 
younger children and where it is financially permissible, that the parent with custody should remain in 
the family home’.  
123
 For analysis of the importance of objective-driven discretion, see Crowley, above n7. 
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 See Ellman, above n 90; Miles, above n 28. 
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The adoption of a proposal, akin to that presented, would carry with it a number of 
advantages, from both a practical and a theoretical perspective.  
Better facilitates consistency, predictability and the attainment of ‘proper provision’ 
A key advantage of this proposal is that, if framed appropriately, such reform should allow 
for greater consistency and predictability in the provision of ancillary relief in Ireland. As 
Parkinson has noted: 
‘Predictability in the law is important in order to ensure that lawyers can confidently 
give advice on the likely outcome of a case if it is litigated. As Birks (citation omitted) 
wrote in another context: “It is essential in modern society that the law be closely 
and cogently reasoned. Access to the courts is hugely expensive. An expensive palm 
tree is no use to the people. The law must be so stated as to facilitate prediction and 
advice. It is impossible otherwise to plan with confidence. And it is impossible to 
know when to litigate.” The fewer the palm trees in family law, the better.’125 
In particular, such reform would place financially weaker spouses in a much stronger 
position in court applications and, especially, in private ordering, while simultaneously 
better ensuring fairness in a general sense.  Moreover, despite incorporating important rules 
and frameworks in the division of property and the calculation of spousal support, the 
proposal retains important discretionary powers for the judiciary at key stages of the 
process, thereby retaining essential flexibility. Although it may be argued that the inclusion 
of even residual discretion would be liable to undermine the certainty on which such a 
regime would be founded, the inclusion of a clear objective(s) to which the judiciary would 
be required to have regard in exercising this discretion would better ensure a clear line of 
authority emerging from the courts. The overall aim of such a proposal would be to better 
facilitate the attainment of ‘proper provision’ in the vast majority of cases than appears to 
be the situation pursuant to the current scheme despite, perhaps, no longer placing such 
provision as the explicit objective.  
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 P Parkinson ‘The Yardstick of Equality: Assessing Contributions in Australia and England’ (2005) 19 
Int’l JL Pol & Fam 163, 174. Moreover, see Miles, above n 28, p389 notes: ‘[I]n ordinary cases, the fact 
that the parties’ needs will be determinative may make notionally starting at 50:50 appear pointless. 
Even here, however, there may be something intangible (and, more concretely, an enhancement of 
bargaining position) to be gained from the idea that each party is prima facie entitled to an equal 
share of the capital and that a non-owner applicant is not merely a “needy supplicant”.’ (Emphasis 
original).  
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Better supports Article 41 of the Constitution 
Second, the proposal gives greater practical effect to Article 41 of the Constitution which 
pledges to protect the family and, in particular, recognise the contributions of the mother in 
the home. At present, despite this apparent constitutional safeguard, ancillary relief 
provision in Ireland continues to be heavily influenced by the needs of dependent spouses 
and children and there exists a lack of clarity as to importance of sharing, partnership or 
joint efforts.126 The Supreme Court observed in T v T that ‘proper provision’ does not equate 
with ‘property division’127 and in G v G subsequently noted that the requirement to make 
proper provision ‘is not a requirement for the redistribution of wealth’.128 Such 
pronouncements would appear, on initial analysis, to ‘rule out participation in any marital 
acquest and/or compensation’.129  
However, it is increasingly apparent that provision ought not to be limited to meeting need. 
Justice Murray, albeit in the minority in T v T, adopted a strikingly communitarian 
interpretation of proper provision: 
‘Proper provision should seek to reflect the equal partnership of the spouses. Proper 
provision for a spouse who falls into the category of a financially dependent spouse 
… should seek, so far as the circumstances of the case permit, to ensure that the 
spouse is not only in a position to meet her financial liabilities and obligation, 
continue with a standard of living commensurate with her standard of living during 
marriage but to enjoy what may reasonably be regarded as the fruits of the marriage 
so that she can live an independent life and have security in the control of her own 
affairs, with a personal dignity that such autonomy confers, without necessarily 
being dependant on receiving periodic payments for the rest of her life from her 
former husband.’130 
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 While needs are legitimately prioritised in many cases, the entire provision made can be 
interpreted as being needs-based, diminishing the value of the martial partnership or the 
contributions made. This proposal seeks to rectify this perception. 
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 [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321. This seems to fly in the face of ‘the almost universal 
understanding that certain assets should be shared equally on divorce’, as noted in Scherpe and 
Miles, above n 70, p152. See also LA Buckley, ‘“Proper Provision” and “Property Division”: Partnership 
in Irish Matrimonial Property Law in the wake of T v T’ (2004) 3 IJFL 9, 11. 
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 [2011] IESC 40 [22]. The court went on to explain at [25], ‘Proper provision means that the 
provision is reasonable in all the circumstances.’ 
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 Scherpe, n 36, p465. See also, Crowley, above n 89, p210.  
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 [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321. See also GB v AB [2007] IEHC 491.  
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More recently, Hogan J held in LB v Ireland and the Attorney General and PB that in ordering 
ancillary relief for a financially weaker spouse, 
‘the State was doing no more than giving effect to that which is inherent in the 
nature of marriage. Marriage, after all, involves mutual giving and sacrifice. In 
practical terms this means the sharing of outgoings, expenses and, in some respects, 
at least, the capital assets of the parties.’131 
Consequently, as Buckley observes, it is becoming clearer that the justification for the 
delimitation of property rights in the marital breakdown context lies ‘in the nature of the 
family itself rather than on the connected but distinct social policy objective of combatting 
hardship and consequent social ills in the post-marital breakdown context’.132 The inclusion 
of provisions entitling spouses to a share of community assets, on the basis of partnership 
and/or contributions, therefore, builds on this developing judicial recognition and better 
supports the constitutional protection of the family.  
Better ensures theoretical consistency 
Finally, the adoption of a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision would 
provide much needed theoretical consistency to the overall matrimonial property scheme 
applied in Ireland. Although, at first blush, Irish law appears to be strongly separationist, as 
exemplified by the equitable redistribution scheme applied on divorce, communitarian 
principles actually pervade many other areas of Irish matrimonial property law.  
Unlike the majority of common law jurisdictions, Ireland operates a regime of forced 
heirship on death pursuant to the Succession Act 1965. Significantly curtailing a testator’s 
freedom of disposition, section 111 provides that where a testator leaves a spouse and no 
children, the surviving spouse has an automatic right to one-half of the entire estate. 
Alternatively, where the testator leaves a spouse and children, the spouse is entitled to one-
third of the estate. Moreover, the comprehensive protection afforded to non-owning 
spouses pursuant to the Family Home Protection Act 1976, restricting the unilateral 
disposition of the family home, is another feature regularly associated with civil law, 
communitarian regimes and is again founded on communitarian principles.133 Although the 
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 [2012] IEHC 461 at [13]. 
132
 Buckley, above n 6, p86 (emphasis added). 
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 Pursuant to s 3, the written consent of the non-owning spouse is required for the conveyance of 
any interest in the family home, subject only to limited exceptions. Indeed, demonstrating the general 
feeling at the time, upon the introduction of the Family Home Protection Bill, Senator Robinson 
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impetus for the introduction of these legislative enactments may have been 
support/protection based,134 their overall effect is no doubt to incorporate communitarian 
principles during a relationship and on death.   
Despite subsequently falling at the constitutional hurdle, the Matrimonial Home Bill 1993 
was also ‘specifically predicated on partnership ideals’135 and followed much support for a 
more communitarian approach to the ownership of matrimonial property, particularly the 
family home, in the Irish legislature. The introduction of some form of community of 
property was first mooted with the Succession Act 1965 and subsequently reiterated by the 
Report of the Commission on the Status of Women in 1972.136 The desirability of a regime 
founded on a community of property was raised again in 1993 in the Report of the Second 
Commission on the Status of Women.137 Consequently, as Senator Gallagher explained, the 
1993 Bill was considered by the Commission and the Minister as ‘a first step in providing a 
suitable régime of marital property’.138 The protection of the matrimonial home was, she 
noted, a ‘matter of priority’ in this regard.139  
Indeed, notwithstanding the lack of a legislatively or judicially-developed principle of 
equality, a scheme based on equitable redistribution, similar to a community of property 
approach, also facilitates sharing out of a community fund on marriage dissolution140 and is 
based on the view that marriage is a partnership. However, there is a spectrum of 
interference in matrimonial property regulation giving effect to the view of marriage as a 
partnership and recognising the joint efforts of the couple. The two approaches are at 
different points on that spectrum.141 Irish law has been inching further along the continuum 
                                                                                                                                                                      
described it ‘as an interim measure on the road to a proper and just system of co-ownership of the 
matrimonial home’. Seanad Deb 1 July 1976, vol 84, col 923. For more, see K O’Sullivan, ‘Protection 
against the Unilateral Disposition of the Family Home: An Irish perspective’ (2013) 27(3) Int’l J L Pol & 
Fam 399. 
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 See K O’ Sullivan, ‘Spousal Disinheritance Protections under Irish Law: A Proposal for Reform’ 
(2012) 41(3) Comm L W Rev 246 for discussion of the rationale for the provision of the legal right 
share. 
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 Buckley, above n 127. However, s 7 of the 1993 Bill permitted a married couple or a couple 
contemplating marriage to opt out or exclude the application of s 4. 
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 (Stationary Office 1972) 175. 
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 (Stationary Office 1993).  
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 Seanad Deb 27 October 1993, vol 137, col 1539. 
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 Seanad Deb 27 October 1993, vol 137, col 1540. 
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above n 52, p68. 
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 See Dewar, above n 37.  
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since the introduction of the Succession Act 1965 and it is submitted it is time to continue 
the journey.142  
Conclusion 
The political difficulties of tampering with family law have long been observed. Maclean and 
Eekelaar note, ‘As society becomes more fluid and more diverse, the chances of creating a 
new family law which will not offend the private values and expectations of a significant 
number of potential voters become slimmer and slimmer.’ 143 Moreover, in the specific area 
of ancillary relief, it has been noted, albeit in relation to Australia, ‘how difficult it can be to 
change the law … and how attached family law professionals are to the now traditional 
technique of wide–ranging judicial discretion’. 144 
Yet, notwithstanding the political challenges involved in effecting change in relation to 
ancillary relief provision, it is clear such reform (or, at minimum, a comprehensive legislative 
review) is required as a priority in Ireland. It has been observed: 
‘Family Law functions in a paternalistic and patriarchal way by intervening in the 
private sphere of the family in order to protect vulnerable members of that family 
unit, particularly when the family unit begins to break down. Here, there are two 
defined protective roles: physical protection and economic protection.’145 
Unfortunately, it is evident from the above that there are clear shortcomings in the highly 
discretionary approach to ancillary relief applied in Ireland pursuant to the Family Law 
(Divorce) Act 1996 which appear to be leaving financially weaker spouses potentially void of 
such ‘economic protection’. In order to overcome these weaknesses, while simultaneously 
promoting consistency in judicial outcomes and facilitating parties reaching a fair settlement 
in an informal setting, what we need in Ireland are a priori declarations about the rights and 
responsibilities to which marriage gives rise, encapsulated within a more rule-oriented 
system of ancillary relief. However, although the Irish Government clearly supports the 
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development of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the family law sphere,146 whether this will 
actually translate into reform initiatives to better achieve these aims, akin to those 
suggested above, appears doubtful. In particular, it has been noted, 
‘The likelihood of a legislative initiative by government to provide for a regime of 
community of property in the future is minimal. While a system of community of 
property is in force in a variety of forms in a number of States, the practical and legal 
difficulties involved in superimposing such a system on a common law jurisdiction in 
which a regime of independent property ownership has been in operation for over a 
hundred years would be enormous’.147 
It is contended much of this scepticism as to the viability of reform on the basis of a more 
rule-oriented approach is due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the constitutional 
parameters which limit ancillary relief reform in Ireland and, equally, the ability to retain 
important flexibility in an otherwise rule-oriented system. 
Buckley noted in 2002: ‘To date, the focus in Ireland has been on ameliorating existing rules, 
rather than on revising the nature of the system itself – on remedying individual instances of 
injustice, rather than on providing a prescription for the just ownership of marital 
property.’148 As we approach the 20th anniversary of the introduction of divorce in Ireland, it 
is strongly argued the time has come for a comprehensive rethink about how we address 
ancillary relief in the jurisdiction and how we intend to overcome the significant 
shortcomings which have emerged in the application of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. 
In this exercise, it is contended we must afford serious consideration, perhaps for the first 
time, to the opportunities presented by a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief 
provision.  
Note: This research was published as ‘Rethinking Ancillary Relief on Divorce in Ireland: The 
Challenges and Opportunities’ (2016) 36(1)  Legal Studies 111-135. 
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